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The Neglect of Governance in Forest Sector Vulnerability Assessments:
Structural-Functionalism and “Black Box” Problems in Climate Change
Adaptation Planning
Adam M. Wellstead 1, Michael Howlett 2,3 and Jeremy Rayner 4
ABSTRACT. Efforts to develop extensive forest-based climate change vulnerability assessments have informed proposed
management and policy options intended to promote improved on-the-ground policy outcomes. These assessments are derived
from a rich vulnerability literature and are helpful in modeling complex ecosystem interactions, yet their policy relevance and
impact has been limited. We argue this is due to structural-functional logic underpinning these assessments in which governance
is treated as a procedural “black box” and policy-making as an undifferentiated and unproblematic output of a political system
responding to input changes and/or system prerequisites. Like an earlier generation of systems or cybernetic thinking about
political processes, the focus in these assessments on macro system-level variables and relationships fails to account for the
multi-level or polycentric nature of governance and the possibility of policy processes resulting in the nonperformance of critical
tasks.
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INTRODUCTION: FEASIBILITY IN FOREST
PLANNING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION
The ability of natural resource sectors to adapt to climate
change has become an issue of concern for those charged with
forest stewardship and those who derive their livelihoods from
forested lands. And, in the wake of failures of multi-lateral
and multi-sectoral mitigation efforts like the Kyoto Protocol
or the Copenhagen Accord to control greenhouse gases,
attention is now focused on national and subnational level
sectoral plans for adaptation.  
How to develop these plans and what factors or variables to
include and account for in order to achieve policy goals are,
however, uncertain. In the climate change policy arena, there
is a prevalence of “wicked problems” in which the source,
framing, and solution to policy problems are all contested
(Rittel and Webber 1973). Moreover, many observers argue
that successful adaptation will require wholesale behavioral
and institutional change at multiple levels, from the individual
and the corporation to the state (Gale 2008). Determining both
what should be done and what is feasible in present
circumstances is thus of great significance to both analysts and
practitioners (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012. See also
Huitt 1968, Meltsner 1972, Majone 1975), and forest
vulnerability assessments and climate change adaptation
policies must take both aspects of policy-making into account.
However, observing this dual imperative does not always
occur. 
This is apparent, for example, in the case of many high-profile
forest sector adaptation studies. The first steps towards the
development of adaptation policies have already taken place
in the forest sector, and the contours of the recommendations
for government action can now be discerned. These
vulnerability assessments and fledgling frameworks have
proposed a host of management and policy recommendations
but rely upon a form of “structural-functional” reasoning
which presents a false sense of what is possible, and proper,
in terms of policy processes and outputs. This logic presents
management and policy innovations as quasi-automatic
responses to climate change-related changes in the forest
ecosystems and does not properly account for political and
other factors that affect policy-making and policy outcomes.  
This problem has been recognized in some of the academic
literature on vulnerability, which has drawn attention to the
many ways in which structural-functional “input-output”
approaches to adaptation overlook the tendency of
contemporary forest governance to support the status quo in
management options and policy outcomes. While this latter
literature remains dominated by empirical case studies, we
argue that the time is ripe for a theoretical synthesis of the
evidence that it presents. As we argue, governance-related
issues will increasingly come to the forefront of adaptation
planning exercises but will require significant changes in the
logic of assessment frameworks if governance challenges are
to be properly accounted for and the outcomes of the
frameworks and reports successfully carried through to
fruition and implementation.
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The neglect of governance and the persistence of
structural functionalism in forest sector vulnerability
assessments
Governmental vulnerability assessments are part of a broader
trend in natural resource management that attempts to apply
vulnerability assessment frameworks to natural resource
management issues. A growing number of national and
subnational exercises draw heavily upon similar efforts carried
out by the larger international epistemic community, notably
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its
Third and Fourth Assessment Reports (Preston et al. 2010).
The Third Assessment Report, in turn, draws upon Smit et al.
’s (1999) climate change assessment framework, and this
general approach has been emulated at the forest sector level.
We argue that the current omission of governance
considerations in government vulnerability assessment
frameworks in these and many other similar reports is founded
on an analysis of social and policy processes rooted in high-
level models of ecosystem and community impacts of, and
responses to, climate change that were widely discredited in
the sociological and political science literature more than 50
years ago. In order to illustrate these problems, we highlight
assessments in three major countries: Australia, Canada, and
the United States.  
In Australia, the National Climate Change Adaptation
Research Facility, an initiative of the Australian government,
recently released An Assessment of the Vulnerability of
Australian Forests to the Impacts of Climate Change. This
four-report assessment by leading Australian climate change
scholars, based on the IPCC Working Group II’s (Smit and
Pilifosova 2001) pioneering framework, was initiated in order
to “provide information to assist governments, natural
resource management managers and the business sector to
adapt to the changing climatic environment in a manner
consistent with principles of sustainable forest management”
(Wilson and Turton 2010). In their report, Climate Change
Adaptation Options, Tools and Vulnerability, Wilson and
Turton (2010) acknowledge that very little is understood about
governance mechanisms, and the subject is sparingly
discussed. However, when it is mentioned, governance is
treated simply as a variable that constrains adaptive capacity.
Cockfield et al.’s (2011) report, The Socio-economic
Implications of Climate Change, for example, states that “with
regard to forests and forest management accelerating impacts
may lead to classic paradigmatic change but the need for the
adaptive governance of social-ecological systems” (p. 57).
This trend of conceptualizing governance as an input variable
in a social-ecological system is also prevalent in North
American assessments.  
In the Canadian forest sector, for example, the
intergovernmental Canadian Council of Forest Ministers
(CCFM) commissioned a Task Force with the primary goal
of providing “the forest sector with state-of-the-art tools and
new knowledge that will allow them to assess the
vulnerabilities, risks, and opportunities associated with
climate change” (Canadian Council of Forest Ministers 2012).
One of these tools, very similar to the Australian effort, is
Adapting Sustainable Forest Management to Climate Change:
A Framework for Assessing Vulnerability and Mainstreaming
Adaptation into Decision Making (Williamson et al. 2012).
One of the key components of the CCFM framework is
adaptive capacity, which is defined as “the ability of a system
to adjust to changing internal demands and external
circumstances” (Carpenter and Brock 2008). Moreover,
adaptive capacity in the CCFM framework is “represented as
a function of specific determinants such as the effectiveness
of institutions, the availability of technological options, the
availability of human and social capital (e.g., skills, education,
experience, and networks), information and information
management, financial resources and natural capital, and the
capacity for risk management” (p. 11). Williamson et al.
(2012) also highlight adaptive capacity deficits that are the
“results of factors causing under- or overinvestment in
adaptive capacity ‘assets’ that may arise due to market,
governance, institutional, and social system failures.” As a
result, governance is again treated not as a major independent
determinant of policy content but simply as another input
variable that needs to be calibrated in order to positively affect
adaptive capacity. 
Provincial governments in Canada, which have primary
jurisdiction in the forest sector, have also undertaken similar
vulnerability assessments and developed their own adaptation
frameworks. For example, the 2009 Expert Panel on Climate
Change Adaptation in Ontario led to the development of the
Ontario Climate Change Action Framework, which was to be
a blueprint for all sectors. It argued that the establishment of
“good governance” was an important component of its
adaptive decision framework, which was seen as the beginning
of a planning cycle leading to a vulnerability assessment, then
a risk assessment, and then finally the development of
adaptation options (Government of Ontario 2011). This
assessment, too, treats government and governance as easily
manipulated reactive or automatic system variables. The
department responsible for forest management, the Ontario
Ministry of Natural Resources, has been tasked with
developing a Forest Adaptation Assessment (Government of
Ontario 2011).  
In the United States, the USDA Forest Service has also
followed the “vulnerability assessment framework” path by
developing a “Strategic Framework for Responding to Climate
Change” and a “National Roadmap for Responding to Climate
Change.” These strategies were also the result of
comprehensive vulnerability assessments (USDA Forest
Service 2010). However, unlike the Australian and Canadian
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cases, the U.S. Forest Service also implemented a “Climate
Change Performance Scorecard.” The scorecard was to be
implemented in all National Forests and Grasslands and would
report on-the-ground accomplishments and plans for
improvement in four dimensions—organizational capacity,
engagement, adaptation, and mitigation (USDA Forest
Service 2011). Within the adaptation dimension, vulnerability
assessments would “assess the vulnerability of key resources
to the impacts of climate change and the interaction with other
stressors and human communities” (USDA Forest Service
2011). However, despite its pivotal role in subsequent policy
specification and adoption, the role of government and
governance is notably absent from this document. 
Thus, despite the efforts and resources dedicated to developing
the above three frameworks, they all fail to seriously
incorporate a substantive and coherent governance analysis
but rather treat government as just another system variable.
Ironically, this limited view of governance may inhibit the
formulation of meaningful adaptation policy-making that is
sought out by the government agencies that fund these
assessments. While these assessments are heuristically
valuable tools, further development of key concepts, such as
governance, is required in order for government policy-makers
and analysts to have a critical and meaningful dialogue about
the steps required to address and implement climate adaptation
in the forest sector.  
In contrast to the forestry vulnerability assessment
frameworks, a new generation of adaptation case studies,
motivated in part by the apparent failure of real communities
to respond as the vulnerability models predicted, does raise
concerns about the need to properly understand and
incorporate governance-related challenges into proposals for
policy change (Preston et al. 2010). Keskitalo’s (2009)
investigation of adaptation in reindeer herding, forestry, and
fishing communities in northern Norway, Sweden, and
Finland, for example, “highlights the political and interest-
based character of governance, where distribution of power
rather than physical risk may be determining institutional
interactions” (p. 201). Raitio’s (2012) case study of
collaborative planning “as a multilevel practice embedded in
institutions” (p. 315) demonstrates the difficulty of translating
collaborative approaches (often a key recommendation in
adaptation frameworks) from one regulatory context to
another. Wall and Marzall’s (2006) attempt to make the
theory–empirical link in their development of a Canadian rural
community-level framework for adaptive capacity is another
example that recognizes the need to treat government as more
than just another system variable (see also Brooks et al. 2005,
Lebel et al. 2006, Norris et al. 2008, Brown 2009, Davidson
2010, Gupta et al. 2010, Termeer et al. 2010, Keskitalo et al.
2011).  
However, not all adaptation studies take this approach and
many retain the same faults as those of the vulnerability studies
cited. For example, Engle and Lemos (2010) note the
importance of “governance and institutional mechanisms” as
determinants in characterizing adaptive capacity, and rank a
suite of governance and institutional indicators for
communities in Brazil’s river basins. Nonetheless, the key
political and governance considerations that would explain
how the indicators will be used to coordinate activities aimed
toward adaptation goals in the absence of political
commitment from government and how that commitment
emerges from political conflict are missing. In such cases, the
analysis jumps quickly and uneasily between high-level
abstraction and microlevel policy recommendations, and skips
over the “missing middle” of governance variables, which are
critical to joining the two levels together in practice (Nilsson
et al. 2011, Voß and Borneman 2011).
THE CURRENT STATE OF VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS ON GOVERNANCE
AND CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN
NATURAL RESOURCE SECTORS
The absence of considerations of meso-level governance or
societal steering activities and capacities in the framework
literature means the lack of impact on the ground among
policy-makers from the new generation of case studies is
hardly surprising. The models upon which they draw were
developed for other reasons, such as ecosystem impact
modeling and studies of community resilience (Walker and
Cooper 2011), and they are not suited to policy analysis
without significant modification, which as we have seen, is
rarely done. Although currently in vogue in many geography
and natural resource management programs, these models are
not well suited to the development of feasible policy
prescriptions or to the actual practices of policy-making,
where the issues of political power, unequal resource
distribution, and institutional legacies noted in the case studies
are very central concerns which cannot simply be ignored or
glossed over (D’Alessandro et al. 2010, Skodvin et al. 2010).
 
We argue that, ultimately, the difficulties encountered in
moving from the macro or system level to the policy (meso)
level in forest sector climate change adaptation frameworks
result from a failure of existing models and analyses to include
or properly conceptualize and weight the role played by meso-
level institutional and political variables in mediating between
macrolevel ecosystem and social system parameters and
microlevel actor behavior and outputs. This omission, we
argue, is in turn attributable to the structural-functional logic
that imbues the many models and frameworks used in
vulnerability and climate change assessments (Hempel 1959,
Greenstein 1973, Parsons 1975). This logic is one that simply
assumes that governance activities will be performed in
Ecology and Society 18(3): 23
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss3/art23/
Fig. 1.Modification of Fussel and Klein’s (2006) Adaptation Policy Processes Model.
specific ways due to system-level prerequisites (Cummins
1975), and ignores the complexity of the policy process itself
and the possible nonperformance of mission critical tasks
(Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009, Wu et al. 2010, Weible et
al. 2012). Like an earlier generation of systems or cybernetic
thinking about political processes and outcomes, many
vulnerability assessment frameworks treat government as a
procedural “black box” in which policy-making is an
undifferentiated and unproblematic activity of a political
system which takes place in the context of system needs and
inputs (Easton 1965). As was pointed out more than half a
century ago in the context of criticisms of the then prevalent
structural-functional sociological theory, this exclusive focus
on macro systems-level variables and relationships fails to
account for many key political variables that affect policy-
making, and therefore serves as a very poor predictor of actual
activity on the ground (Barber 1956).
The resurgence of structural functionalism in
vulnerability assessment frameworks
The first problem in nearly all vulnerability assessment
frameworks is the wholesale neglect or severe
underspecification of political variables, in particular those
dealing with policy-making, a neglect that is the direct result
of the functional logic underlying them (Cummins 1975). 
Fig. 1 from Füssel and Klein’s (2006) well-known and oft-
cited[1] assessment of climate change adaptation policy
processes typifies the main components of these functional
approaches to adaptation (Fig. 1). The authors draw their
analysis from earlier contributions, namely Smit and Wandel
(2006), as well as resilience studies such as Adgar (2006),
Folke (2006), Gallopin (2006), and Nelson et al. (2007).[2] 
As Fig. 1 shows, the structural framework is pitched at a very
high level of generality and attempts to model relationships
existing among various ecosystem elements related to
measures such as exposure, sensitivity, impacts, adaptive
capacity, vulnerability, and adaptation at the macro or systems
level. The level of generality is clear even in the definition of
“adaptation” in these models, which refers to “the adjustment
in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or
exploits beneficial opportunities.” Similarly, adaptive
capacity is concerned with “the ability of a system to adjust
to climate change (including climate variability and extremes)
to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of
opportunities, or to cope with the consequences” (Füssel and
Klein 2006, p. 18). 
It is important to note that politics, governance, and policy-
making are not defined or further analyzed in this assessment
model, and, in general, political relationships are understood
as a kind of input variable promoting adaptation “functions”
(Holling 1973, 2001, Folke et al. 2002). Füssel and Klein
(2006), for example, state that there are two important
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Table 1.Treatment of governance in the vulnerability assessment literature.
 
Author Discussion of governance
Adger (2006) “The remaining challenge is in combining measurement of aspects of vulnerability and thresholds
within systems with explanations of whole-system vulnerability and the role of institutions and
governance processes.” (p. 275)
 
Brooks et al. (2005) “The results from the focus group exercise emphasizes the importance of governance indicators.” (p.
161)
 
Engle and Lemos (2010) “Among those, governance and institutional mechanisms represent one set of system attributes that
scholars believe is particularly important.” (p. 5)
 
Lebel et al. (2006) “The kinds of attributes we are initially interested in are those frequently considered to be part of
‘good’ governance, e.g., participation, representation, deliberation, accountability, empowerment,
social justice, and organizational features such as being multilayered and polycentric.”
“A capacity for self-organization means that a system has ways to maintain and re-create its identity.
Although most systems are linked to, and impacted by, other systems, self-organizing systems are
able to buffer the impacts of other systems and do not need to be continually invested in, subsidized,
or replenished from outside to persist.”
 
adaptation-related functions that governments perform:
facilitation and implementation. Facilitation refers to activities
that enhance adaptive capacity, such as scientific research data
collection, awareness raising, and capacity building, and the
establishment of institutions, information networks, and legal
frameworks for action. Implementation refers to activities that
actually avoid adverse climate impacts on a system by
reducing its exposure or sensitivity to climatic hazards or by
moderating relevant nonclimatic factors. This literature thus
typically notes the importance of political institutions in
addressing adaptation and adaptive capacity but models these
variable only in very general terms, with a lack of specifics
with regard to the mechanisms and relationships involved in
deriving policy recommendations and instrument choices
(Daedlow et al. 2011). 
Adger et al. (2007), for example, state only that adaptive
capacity is influenced by “the nature of governance
structures,” while Adger (2006) notes only that the role of
institutions and governance processes “needs to be
considered” along with the physical production and social
variables that compose the system in applying this model to
policy-making and outcomes. Brooks et al. (2005) similarly
develop a suite of governance proxies for national-level
vulnerability to climate change (e.g., political stability and rule
of law), but the specification of exactly how these variables
affect policy dynamics “on the ground” is missing. Plummer
and Armitage (2007) also identify capacity and capacity
building, institutions, social capital and networks, learning,
and vulnerability and livelihoods as critical in their assessment
framework, which in turn are argued to influence
environmental governance, but without any details on how
such processes actually work in either theory or practice. And
Smit and Wandel (2006) state only that “improvements in
institutions” may lead to increased adaptive capacity, without
clarifying the conditions under which this is likely (or not) to
occur. 
A review of leading contributions in the climate change
vulnerability assessment field reveals a similar emphasis on a
macrolevel function treatment of governance in many
studies.[3] Quotes from a sample of such articles are highlighted
Table 1. The functional logic of these analyses, which ignores
meso-level governance institutions and processes, is set out in
Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Structural functional logic of vulnerability
assessment frameworks.
While even these vulnerability assessment frameworks can
provide a useful heuristic, the functionalist assumptions
inherent in these approaches leave much to be desired in terms
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of understanding or accurately characterizing political
phenomena, including activities like public policy-making,
law-making, and legislative and administrative behavior, and
are of little use to actual policy-makers. For example, as the
renowned Norwegian social and political theorist Jon Elster
(1986) noted, functionalism is a “puzzling and controversial”
mode of explanation in general because, unlike other scientific
modes such as causal or intentional explanations (where the
intended consequences occur earlier in time), early events are
explained by another event later in time (p. 31). Thus, in a
functional explanation, “we cite the actual consequences of
the phenomenon in order to account for it” (p. 31). Feedback
loops are the essential mechanism in functional reasoning
because they provide “a causal connection from the
consequences of one event of the kind we are trying to explain
to another, later event of the same kind” (p. 32). However, in
social and political situations, as Elster further argued, such
explanations are “only applicable when a pattern of behavior
maintains itself through the consequences that benefit some
group, which may or may not be the same group of people
displaying the behaviour” (p. 32). That is, an institution or a
behavioral pattern X is explained by its function Y for group
Z if and only if (1) Y is an effect of X, (2) Y is beneficial for
Z, (3) Y is unintended by the actors producing X, (4) Y (or at
least the causal relationship between X and Y) is unrecognized
by the actors in Z, and (5) Y maintains X by a causal feedback
loop passing through Z (p. 28). 
Most attempts to use functionalism in social and political
explanations fail because they are missing one or more of these
five features (Elster 1985). And, as Elster further noted, in
political life there are many examples of singular,
nonrecurring events that produce unintended policy
consequences (such as wars, riots, and rebellions), while
feedback loops are often postulated or tacitly assumed when
they do not in fact exist (Elster 1986). This is just as true of
current forest sector vulnerability assessments as it was of
many social theories and frameworks developed in the
midtwentieth century which Elster criticized.
The “black box” problem: incorporating policy-making
into climate change adaptation models
Even when some political and other similar variables are
incorporated into a vulnerability assessment framework, a
second problem arises due to the lack of specificity about the
mechanisms and internal workings of institutional and other
components of political systems and policy subsystems: the
so-called black box problem of unspecified processual
variables and mechanisms. 
Such concerns about the limitations of high-level systems-
theoretic models when applied to policy-making also surfaced
more than 40 years ago when these models first emerged in
the social sciences. And many of these same concerns
resurface in forestry climate change vulnerability assessments
today (Black 1961, Gregor 1968, Landau 1968, Stephens
1969). Like their contemporary climate change counterparts,
1960s-era political scientists such as Gabriel Almond (1965)
and David Easton (1965) and many others suggested that a
high-level cybernetic view could explain much political
behavior and outcomes. Following general systems theory
scholars such as von Bertalanffy (1969), they argued that the
political system existed within an environment that inputs
resources and demands into the system and produces outputs
(decisions and supports) that operate with feedback loops back
to the environment and system inputs.[4] As Fig. 3 shows, this
model described government or a political system as a simple
feedback system in which a black box converted inputs into
outputs, which in turn, fed back into the environment to
generate new inputs.
Fig. 3. The “black box” model of political system. Source:
adapted from Easton 1965
As early as the 1970s, however, this overly abstract and general
conception of a political system as a resource conversion
mechanism had already been largely discredited. For example,
Lilienfeld (1978) labeled systems theory an “ideological
movement” because of its tendency to assume that systems
maintain themselves in a state of equilibrium, and concluded
that it contained little relevance to the real world where actors
actively sought and produced change, and had even less
practical application. Similarly, Chilcote (1994) found black
box systems-level frameworks did little to explain political or
policy change, yielded few testable hypotheses, and presented
a strong ideological underpinning that sought to downplay
political conflict and promote a technocratic understanding
and approach to political life. Thorson (1970) found the whole
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enterprise futile so long as the black box of real political
processes remained unopened and unexamined. Groth (1970)
found that “structural-functionalism has run aground trying to
specify its model of the social system untangled by
monumental ambiguities and values in the guise of survival
considerations” (p. 499). Such an approach has also failed
convincingly to establish at least some underlying social and
political relationships as “behavioural universals for these
allegedly goals of survival and adaptation” (Groth 1970, p.
499). 
In response to these kinds of concerns with high-level systems
theory, social scientists developed a range of micro- and
middle-range theories that permitted theoretical development
while allowing for empirical investigation of political and
policy processes, hypothesis testing, and careful model
building based on empirical results (Merton 1968, Weick
1974). These approaches, now taken for granted in political
science, examine specific processes in systems models by
focusing on institutions that serve as intermediate variables at
the micro and meso levels affecting policy-making within a
macro systemic context. Taken together, these studies opened
up the highly abstract black box of government processes
found in systems thinking, and promoted a more rigorous,
empirically based understanding of political life and policy
processes and outcomes (Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009). 
Climate change adaptation vulnerability assessments,
including in the forest sector, still await this institutional
“revolution” (Hall and Taylor 1996, Peters 1999). While such
an orientation has begun to appear in some of the case study
literature cited, like earlier generations of social cybernetic or
system theories, much systems-inspired modeling in the
climate change adaptation area continues to rely upon
structural-functionalist tautologies. That is, what are in fact
some of the most determinate actors and variables in any
policy-making process—politics and government—are
simply assumed away in the belief that policy goals will just
be set, and met, since they are “necessary” for the system to
“function.” 
For example, according to Brown (2009), the vulnerability of
Ontario’s forest sector “is reflective of (or a function of) the
exposure and sensitivity of that system to hazardous conditions
and the ability or capacity or resilience of the system to cope,
adapt or recover from the effect of those conditions” (p. 517)
. This analysis provides absolutely no systematic examination
of how political and policy institutions actually operate in
practice nor any determination of whether or not, or under
what circumstances, they might be capable of “delivering the
goods” with respect to climate change adaptation outcomes.
This institutional logic is set out in Fig. 4 and can be compared
with the structural-functional logic of Fig. 2.
MOVING BEYOND STRUCTURAL-
FUNCTIONALISM: IMPROVING CLIMATE
CHANGE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS BY
INCORPORATING THE GOVERNANCE
DIMENSION
The ultimate purpose of climate change vulnerability
assessments, of course, is to accurately inform policy-makers
of the necessary directions and procedures through which
climate change adaptation can be accomplished. And it is here
that paying more attention to governance arrangements and
institutions is most crucial (Koliba et al. 2011). The meso
dimensions that are most often missing from complex adaptive
systems theorizing are precisely the most critical in affecting
on-the-ground policy change and implementation.
Fig. 4. Policy logic with institutional factors included.
Without taking meso-level variables more seriously in their
analyses, as Ascher (2001) argued, the outcomes from
employing vulnerability assessments are likely to lead, at best,
to a range of poor results due to unintended consequences, the
promotion of perverse incentives, and other kinds of policy
failures linked to the adoption of infeasible policy alternatives
(Marsh and McConnell 2010, McConnell 2010). Such
analyses, for example, fail to adequately address governance-
related impacts of even such basic policy-making structures
as federalism or the territorial division of powers between
governments, the so-called basic multilevel or polycentric
nature of contemporary governance (Ostrom 2008, 2009,
McGinnis 2000, Aligica and Tarko 2011, Enderlein et al.
2011).[5] 
In order to enter the realm of feasibility and to achieve practical
relevance, adding meso-level of institutional variables to
climate change vulnerability and subsequent adaptation is a
prerequisite. This involves moving beyond structural
functionalism and in direct contrast to the high level of
abstraction and tendencies of such logics, governance research
focuses upon and seeks to incorporate the details of
formulation and implementation efforts involving multiple
actors in complex models of patterns of political and policy
interaction (Treib et al. 2007). 
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In its broadest sense, governance is a term used to describe
the different possible modes of government coordination of
nongovernmental actors (Rosenau 1992, Kooiman 1993,
2000, de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof 1995, Rhodes 1996, Klijn
and Koppenjan 2000). Governments control the allocation of
resources between social actors by providing a set of rules and
operating a set of institutions that set out “who gets what,
where, when, and how” in society and managing the symbolic
resources of state legitimacy. This is the basis of governing,
and involves the establishment of relationships between
governments and nongovernmental actors that can vary from
highly structured and controlled to arrangements that are
monitored only loosely and informally, if at all. Governance
is about establishing, promoting, and supporting specific types
of relationships between governmental and nongovernmental
actors, and governance considerations have an important
impact on policy processes and decision-making, largely
absent in vulnerability assessments.  
In large part because of the complexities, uncertainties, and
ambiguities of resource and environmental issues noted,
environmental policy has been a key venue for governance
studies, and forest assessments could benefit from this work.
Lacking the knowledge or the mandate to govern alone,
governments in this area have increasingly chosen to try to
construct policy consensus through more engaged and
interactive forms of policy-making and to allow nonstate
actors to implement those policies within a broad framework
of incentives, benchmarking, and private governance (Sprinz
and Vaahtoranta 1994, Zito 2007). This is true in many areas
where efforts have been made to develop integrated strategies
such as forestry and coastal marine ecosystem management
(Howlett and Rayner 2006a, 2006b), and similar efforts are
typical in both climate change mitigation and adaptation
efforts (Voss et al. 2006). In these new governance modes, the
lines between public and private have become blurred (Gatto
2006). From a mode of coordination based on hierarchical top-
down, command and control by government actors or their
agents, governments have increasingly experimented with
new modes of governance that rely on the incentives provided
by markets and by the sharing of information in governance
networks. Recent advances in the natural resource governance
literature have sought to capture these governance dynamics
and their effects on policy-making (Tollefson et al. 2008,
Howlett, Rayner, and Tollefson 2009). Without incorporating
such logics, recommendations stemming from well-meaning
vulnerability assessment may not only be misleading, but
incorrect, out of date, and moving against the current of
contemporary governance and policy instrument choices.
OPENING UP THE BLACK BOX: REVISUALIZING
THE POLICY PROCESS IN CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION MODELING
The neglect of institutional variables in climate change studies
is not unique. As Nilsson et al. (2011) have argued, this neglect
has also occurred in high-level energy systems studies, which
share many similar characteristics in vulnerability assessment
frameworks. As they put it: 
The hitherto superficial treatment of institutions and
politics in energy future studies is somewhat
surprising. Many literatures concerned with
systems-technical change recognize the importance
of institutions in shaping (and interacting with)
technological systems. These insights have emerged
not only in economic history, sociology and political
science, but also prominently in innovation systems
studies, evolutionary and institutional economics,
socio-technical systems, and even more recently in
transitions management and elsewhere. These
perspectives share several insights about institutions,
what they are, why they are relatively stable and how
they change. (p. 1117–1118)  
Understanding the role that meso-level variables play in
climate change adaptation begins by incorporating
governance logics into vulnerability assessment frameworks.
Three specific aspects of policy-making that affect instrument
choices within specific governance contexts need to be
explicitly modeled in these frameworks. The first dimension
is linked to the structure and pervasiveness of policy networks,
which address the balance of power between state actors and
the societal actors and networks, which in turn, are linked to
the kinds of policy instruments that are chosen to give effect
to new governance arrangements (Howlett 2002, 2011). In this
network dimension, the number and diversity of actors (state
and nonstate) that exert some degree of power or influence
over the outputs of the governance arrangements is a key facet
of policy-making (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982, Knoke 1987).
In this respect, the concern of the analyst is to identify where
political power lies in relation to society and the state (Lukes
1974, Lindblom 1977, Katzenstein 1978, Offe 1984). The
challenge is to determine whether, and to what extent, in
specific sectors and issue areas the state or its agents are
directly dictating the outcomes that emerge from the
governance arrangement, more loosely “steering” the
arrangement, or alternatively whether ultimate power to
determine outcomes rests with nonstate actors (e.g.,
corporations, unions, environmental civil society organizations)
(McCool 1998). 
The second dimension has to do with the rigidity of
institutional policy-related arrangements—namely their
formal or informal nature. The institutional aspects of
governance arrangement can be assessed in terms of factors
such as precision (how closely it constrains private action),
obligation (the “bindingness” of its commands), and
delegation (the extent to which the power to adjudicate and
enforce these obligations is retained by a regulator or delegated
to an independent third party) (Tollefson et al. 2012). Recently,
Doelle et al. (2012) explored these two dimensions in a study
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of climate change-based forest governance arrangements in
Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. 
Finally, the third dimension, the policy process, illustrates the
dynamic features of governance arrangements by focusing on
policy-making and policy change. The policy cycle (Hill 2007,
Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009, Pal 2010, Wu et al. 2010)
and policy change frameworks (e.g., advocacy coalition
framework, institutional rational choice, and structural choice)
(Moe 1984, Ostrom 1991, Schlager and Bloomquist 1996,
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999) are familiar approaches that
draw upon the network and institutional dimensions and
provide an even finer, more empirical lens on understanding
the complexity and challenges of governance. Stedman et al.
(2004), Wellstead and Stedman (2007, 2011), and Rayner et
al. (2013) utilized these approaches in their examination of
climate change adaptation policy formulation in the Canadian
agriculture, forestry, and water sectors. 
As Fréchette and Lewis (2011) argue: 
In order to develop a comprehensive understanding
of the dynamics of change, analysts require a meta-
theoretical approach that not only provides
complementary insights into how rules change over
time, but also pushes the boundaries of conventional
analysis to consider the constitutional arrangements
that structure collective action and the subsequent
performance of forest governance structures. (p. 582) 
The use of this kind of framework allows us to open the black
box of governance and assess the feasibility of particular
policy prescriptions, which is, after all, the intent of forest
managers who have invested time and resources into
vulnerability assessments. This analysis also overcomes the
unrealistic assumption that governance will simply “get done”
as a kind of system maintenance activity.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Many existing climate change adaptation frameworks and
vulnerability assessments suffer from conceptual weaknesses
which limit their accuracy and policy relevance. These
weaknesses can be summarized under three headings. First,
they follow an implicit structural-functionalist logic which
treats governments as a black box and policy-making as
undifferentiated and unproblematic. This results in the second
problem: a failure to take into account the complex multilevel
or polycentric nature of contemporary policy-making and
governance. These two problems, in turn, lead to a third: the
tendency to make recommendations for policy action which
are infeasible or difficult if not impossible to implement in
current circumstances.  
Fortunately, the new generation of adaptation case studies now
appearing is much more aware than past ones of the importance
of incorporating and analyzing meso-level factors such as
institutions and policy instruments for the success of
adaptation strategies. Klenk et al. (2011), for example, use the
framework of reflexive modernization to highlight governance
obstacles to achieving sustainable forest management goals.
While some studies have explicitly recognized the need for a
theoretical synthesis that addresses governance variables in
natural resource and environmental studies without appealing
to functionalist explanations of how these variables affect
other system components, these remain few and far between.
 
This development in resource management studies echoes that
in other sectors that have also pointed out the advantages to
practitioners of incorporating governance into macrolevel
systems thinking. For health care, for example, Gómez (2011)
has argued that: 
The practitioner community stands to gain from
applying these theoretical approaches to their
analysis of the institutional aspects of health
governance and health system governance. Instead
of merely measuring the presence of elite
stewardship, strategic vision, responsiveness, and
the like, this alternative approach suggests that
practitioners begin their analysis by specifying the
following issues: political and bureaucratic elite
beliefs, interests, and the supportive coalitions that
motivate elites to become stewards, visionaries, and
to pursue institutional change. In contrast to the
existing literature, this approach therefore sees elite
interests and coalitions as key independent variables
while the aforementioned health governance and
health system governance indicators are treated as
outcomes to be explained. (p. 210) 
Our necessarily brief discussion of the theoretical foundations
of vulnerability assessments for climate change adaptation is
intended to further such efforts by highlighting the complexity
of governance arrangements and the need to adequately model
and account for them in adaptation plans and studies rather
than rely upon outmoded and inaccurate models redolent of
political and sociological theory of the 1950s and 1960s. We
argue that new policy-relevant models can be designed that
take governance issues into account, which can better address
the complexity associated with climate change adaptation than
recommendations based solely upon existing assessments.  
Like the IPCC, we argue in favor of including policy and
governance considerations directly within vulnerability and
adaptation assessments and plans, considerations that are
noticeably lacking in most adaptive planning exercises to date,
such as the Australian, Canadian, and American forest policy
efforts. We argue that the few overt discussions of governance
included in existing forest sector frameworks and plans have
been pitched at too high a level of abstraction. Their focus on
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macro ecological and social systems-level variables has
ignored or minimized the key role played in public policy
decision-making by meso or middle range variables such as
constitutional structures and electoral and administrative
considerations, as well as more microlevel variables related
to the nature of public policy decision-making processes in
democratic states (Nilsson et al. 2011, Voß and Borneman
2011). While the few existing climate change models focused
at the macro level point in the right direction when they
acknowledge the importance of institutions and governance,
they fail to connect with the new generation of case studies
that identify the obstacles to change at the level of governance.
Better modeling and research is needed to understand the
multiple polycentric aspects of governance relations. As Voß
and Bornemann (2011) concluded in their study of adaptive
management: 
Politics cannot be escaped or bypassed, nor
eliminated or completely controlled by governance
designs, but they can be analyzed and reflected on
in order to devise more robust design strategies for
new reflexive forms of governance. This is what we
hope to encourage and support with the provision
of this framework and sketching of avenues for
further research. 
Fortunately, those practitioners undertaking existing or future
vulnerability assessment frameworks can draw upon a rich
governance and public policy literature in improving both their
analyses and their recommendations and prescriptions.
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